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ABSTRACT

In the mid-1980s, the timeframe that the Space Station Freedom
Program was born, it was believed that a new dawn of international
cooperative relationships for all future, large-scale manned space
initiatives was also born. The Space Station Freedom would be the
international
first such program that would characterize
partnerships where intricate and highly dependent relationships
Programs in the next decade and of the 21st
were the norm.
century could be expected to be multi-year, multi-billion dollars
and multi-national. The advantages of multiple nations cooperating
toward a common goal are clear in terms of the economic realities
of sharing in the high costs of research and technology programs,
particularly the cost of manned space endeavors. The opportunity
for nations to contribute in areas of their specific strengths
would aid in pushing to the edge of technology. But there are some
fundamental political and management challenges that programs such
as the Space Station and future ones of this magnitude will face.
Unless these challenges are understood and met head on, the success
of them is uncertain.
PAST INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE SPACE ENDEAVORS

International participation in space endeavors is not new. There
have been numerous cooperative scientific programs between NASA and
a large number of international organizations. Historically, these
arrangements have been characterized by independent contributions
of specific hardware (instruments or infrastructure) which are
integrated into a single satellite or payload under the overall
As the space programs of other
management and control of NASA.
nations have matured, NASA has also contributed hardware or
services to programs managed by the space agencies of other
each
These programs shared common elements*
countries.
participant could plan and manage their activity relatively
independently as long as agreed-to interface requirements, program
milestones and overall schedules were met. But as the nature of
these programs has evolved in scope, complexity, and cost the
relationship among the players has begun to evolve from joint
participation towards true partnerships in a relatively high stakes
game.
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Spacelab and the Remote Manipulator System are often cited as the
first evolutionary step in international manned space programs.
These programs do represent, for NASA, a major "sea change" in
cooperation with an international entity (i.e., the European Space
Agency and the Canadian Space Agency). NASA, however, was still
clearly the dominant "partner," establishing the rules by which the
junior partners could play.
In these programs, NASA still
maintained and demonstrated the U.S. space leadership role.
SPACE STATION FREEDOM "PARTNERSHIP"

With the initiation of the Space Station Freedom Program a
fundamental difference from previous international space programs
was introduced.
From its inception, the Space Station Freedom
Program was designed to be a partnership between nations where each
participating government committed to carry the program through to
completion. This commitment was formalized through Intergovernment
Agreements (IGA's) executed on the part of the United States by the
Secretary of State.
In addition, Memoranda of Understanding
(MOU's) were signed by the respective space agencies of each
signatory nation. Thus a fundamental commitment was made both at
the political level as well as the implementing level for this
program.
The strength of this fundamental commitment has been "put to the
test" several times in the life of the Space Station Freedom, and
the results of the latest Clinton Administration pledge to honor
the international partnership and commitments in the midst of major
redesign are yet to be determined. In 1991, when the U.S. Congress
came very close to canceling the Space Station Freedom Program, the
three Partners, Japan, Canada, and the Europeans, issued a Joint
Communique stating a "disbelief that the U.S.A. would now consider
withdrawing from such an important international venture thereby
effectively terminating the program."
The hurdle of 1991 was
tackled and the "partnership" was able to recover with the
commitments in tact. This hurdle of 1993 appears to be even more
of a challenge. The effort to "save billions" by redesigning the
Station was directed by President Clinton.
The impacts on the
International Partners, although yet to be determined, have
certainly caused the Partners to question the value of a U.S.
"commitment."
Beyond the requirement of this fundamental national commitment, the
evolution to a international space partnership relationship
requires rethinking the ground rules by which such programs will be
managed. The fact that other nations now have more to offer based
on their growing maturity in the space business makes them more
capable partners who are also less willing to simply sign-up under
NASA dictates.
By definition, a partnership involves close
cooperation between parties having specified and joint rights and
responsibilities.
While it is easy to understand and define
specific and individual responsibilities, the difficulty arises in
defining and reaching agreement over the specific and joint rights

7-18

shared by the partners. This has been particularly difficult for
NASA which comes from a tradition of "going it alone" as opposed to
the European Space Agency which from its inception was organized
around the concept of a multinational partnership where each
partner's rights, obligations, and responsibilities were negotiated
and agreed to "up front". The "going it alone" attitude seems to
extend beyond a NASA tradition — if political players have the
power to rethink priorities to the point of impacting foreign
commitments, a "partnership" will never truly be developed in the
future space endeavors.
"PARTNERSHIP" CHALLENGES

The Space Station Freedom is unique when compared to past manned
space flight endeavors but it has characteristics which will likely
be shared by all future international manned endeavors.
COMMON ATTRIBUTES OF INTERNATIONAL MANNED PROGRAMS

o

Satisfies scientific, economic, and political
objectives

o

Involves a large number of U.S. and foreign
contractors and government agencies

o

Requires resources in the multibillion dollar range

o

Extended time periods in excess of ten years

o Develops complex technology, sometimes reaching beyond
the state of the art
o

Utilizes large force of scientists, engineers,
technicians, and administrative personnel

o

Requires construction of extensive, expensive, and
highly specialized facilities located across the world

o

Obtains direct and constant Executive and
Congressional scrutiny (similar oversight in partners
countries) throughout the life of the program
(TABLE 1)

For such partnership to survive, each partner must be sensitive to
the variety of pressures and constraints acting upon the individual
partners. Accommodations, both technical and political, must be
found which will allow the partnership to be maintained. Several
of these attributes may also be recognized as risks — such as
multi-billion-dollar price tag and the program life time in excess
of ten years.
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Political Challenges
A 1988 National Academies of Sciences and Engineering report stated
that "partnerships with other nations and organizations can serve
to demonstrate leadership, to forge productive relationships and to
broaden the range of available opportunities, but only if
commitments are made carefully and honored
international
fully...and be supported at the highest possible levels in the
participating governments, with as much breadth as is feasible."
The political challenges that future partnerships may face seem to
have all been experienced in the life of the Space Station Freedom
Program. The political challenge of maintaining the original U.S.
commitment from President Reagan in 1984 has taken a great deal of
effort and the realities of 1993 indicate that the challenge will
not be won easily. The White House has been occupied by two
Presidents since Reagan and national priorities continue to change
with every new Congress. No longer can the mere "excitement" of
space exploration be the basis for maintaining commitment to manned
For such programs to maintain a broad-based
space initiatives.
constituency over extended periods of time, these programs must
serve the national interest, primarily economic interests.
This broad-based commitment must, as was stated above, be supported
A
at the highest possible levels of participating governments.
program must then be prepared to maintain political support
throughout the life of the program and "educate" the new political
players about the program, the commitments, and the requirements as
The U.S. budget process, which
they enter into the process.
requires NASA to justify their programs every year, may be the
This
biggest hurdle large-scale initiatives face in the U.S.
their
reevaluate
to
Congress
allows
essentially
process
"commitment" every year. To manage a program under this process is
as challenging as it is inefficient when the commitment of a new
Congress or an incoming Administration waivers, as it has in the
Each year, any individual has the
Space Station Program.
opportunity to challenge whatever has previously been approved.
political support has consumed a
maintain
and
regain
to
effort
The
great deal of time and resources.
The broader the base of the original commitment, the easier it will
The activities of the U.S. Space
be to maintain this support.
Station Freedom Program literally spread across 37 of the U.S.
But given the diverse expectations concerning the Space
states.
Station and the "downscaling" due to budgetary constraints, not all
This has
expectations can be met with the initial capability.
created a base of non-supporters.
The essence of a "partnership" can play a key role in a changing
A commitment made with an international
environment as well.
entity is not made lightly and is not broken lightly. When one
partner faces a threat that could impact another partner,
politicians often respond to an international concern when they
might have otherwise allowed the priority to slip lower. Although
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the international aspect of the Space Station Freedom has NOT
deterred the Congress or the President from directing major
"restructuring" changes and the current "redesign" exercise,
they have always stated that the U.S. will "maintain our
Although the impact can never be
international commitments."
measured, the international commitment may have prevent out-right
cancellation of the Program in the face of the U.S. priority
shifts.
Programmatic Challenges
Beyond this fundamental challenge of obtaining and maintaining
political commitment, large space initiative will face additional
challenges.
The term "programmatic" has been used within the Space Station
Freedom Program to incorporate all the non-technical activities many of the requirements that exist because of the bureaucratic
The inter
nature of the management of cooperative endeavors.
relationship between the political, programmatic and technical
considerations are very complex.
The essence of a "partnership" must be defined and agreed upon
between partners at the outset of the program - not simply defining
'who is responsible for what 1 in the technical sense, but the
definition and establishment of the ground rules for the management
of the program. The top-level agreements and understandings of the
management structure proved to be an enormous effort for the Space
Station Freedom Program. It was January 1984 when President Reagan
announced his commitment for a space station and extended the
invitation to other countries to participate. It was a year before
Canada, Japan and Europe accepted the invitation "in principle" and
it was the Fall of 1988 before the IGA's and MOU's were signed.
The fact that four years were required to achieve this initial
agreement exemplifies the challenges faced.
Other programmatic concerns within an international endeavor are
the laws of the countries involved. Two very specific challenges
that are and will be faced in these big-ticket space programs are
"Buy
and
Transfer"
"Technology
of
issues
headline
the
American/European/Japanese" laws that most countries have. There
is a delicate balance between the positive aspects of a partnership
and the potential to "give too much away" in terms of new
technology or potential profitable business. It is critical that
the "programmatic" policy is developed in the earliest stages of a
joint program to avoid upsetting the balance with either the
The technical development
political and technical challenges.
should not be side-tracked when programmatic issues must be
resolved or revisited.
A partnership attitude and trust must be developed between all
players. For the good of the program as a whole, it is important
that the programmatic status of each partner's responsibilities of
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the program is shared; i.e. the political or budgetary threats,
issues within contractors, material availability, schedule delays.
It is a challenge for each partner to know when an internal issue
could effect the other partners and also when the other partners
could have a positive approach to minimize a potential problem.
Technical Challenges
Although the expected management challenges of the future largescale, manned space initiatives will be a major focus, a
fundamental reason for establishing partnerships is to pool the
technical resources and utilize the varied strengths of all
partners in an effort to push the state of the art. A partnership
will have been formed to approach a basic technical challenge. The
technical immaturity of a space-related development goal introduces
obstacles that will require a strong yet flexible management
approach in order to progress. Development programs are evolving
programs. The importance of establishing baseline is as important
as establishing the means in which to change a baseline.
In the Memorandums of Understanding, each partner serves as a full
member of the Space Station Control Board (SSCB). All partners
have the opportunity to assess all design changes and submit
The "partnership" is maintained by the
impacts to the Board.
programmatic requirement that ALL impacts must be addressed with
recommendations to the SSCB chairman. Compromises often must be
made at the Board.
An example of a recent design change and its unanticipated impact
to the International Partner (specifically the European Space
Agency, ESA) follows. The initial impact appeared to be a negative
one on the partners, but at the conclusion of the assessment and
solution proposal, the design change had positive effects in other
ways.
A NASA technical decision was made to change to a "decentralized"
avionics air cooling system. This decision resulted in an overall
weight savings to the U.S. Laboratory at launch, additional savings
in rack volume, and saving in the power usage — all considered to
be critical improvements to the development program. The central
avionics air cooling ducting was deleted, thereby forcing each
payload and core systems rack to contain its own fan-forced cooling
and rack controller package ("rack essential package"). Prior to
this design change, NASA and the Partners had signed an
"International Standard Rack Agreement". By changing this standard
rack configuration, the program was forced to reassess the
desirability of a standard rack and the impact to the Partners to
accept the design changes in their racks.
Through a series of teleconferences and face-to-face technical
meetings, it was decided that it was in the best interest of the
In order to
whole program to maintain a common standard rack.
minimize the design (and cost) impact of the decision to the
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International Partners, NASA has agreed to provide to the Partners
these "rack essential packages 11 .
In addition, through these technical discussions, it became evident
that decision to maintain common racks had the additional benefit
of achieving a common fire detection and suppression system across
all modules, therefore improving Space Station safety.
To implement the design improvements, the partners would have
incurred significant additional costs arising from changing their
The costs incurred by NASA for
industry technical baseline.
procurement of the "rack essential packages" would avoid the
significant additional costs which NASA would otherwise incur for
unique interfaces, unique integration and verification activities,
unique maintenance and spares requirements and the extensive safety
analysis of the fire detection and suppression systems.
SSFP APPROACH TO ACHIEVE TOTAL PROGRAM INTEGRATION
Joint Agreements

The Intergovernmental Agreement (between the U.S. Government and
the Partner governments) and the individual Memorandums of
Understanding (MOU) (between the government agencies — NASA
agreements with the European Space Agency (ESA), the Canadian Space
Agency (CSA), and the National Space Agency of Japan (NASDA) ) are
the baselined, top-level agreements by which the partnerships are
governed. The Intergovernmental Agreement provides the partnership
objective and scope, international rights and obligations, and
policy statements on such things as utilization, operations,
liability, and exchange of data and goods. The MOU provides the
basis for cooperation between NASA and its Partners with
implementation details supporting the Intergovernmental Agreement
policy statements .
Joint Management Mechanisms
There are also additional joint management mechanisms in the form
of "living" documents (that are updated and grow with the program's
maturity) and agreements that maintain programmatic, management and
technical structure of the joint program.
Each MOU invokes a Joint Program Plan (JPP) to be signed by the
program managers of the relevant agencies. This document addresses
the Level I interrelationship between the NASA Program Director and
the partner Level 1-equivalent manager. The JPP authorizes a Joint
Management Plan (JMP) which defines the management process between
the Level II SSFP Program Office and the respective partner Level
This document defines all joint
II-equivalent program offices.
documentation, it defines all joint activities, and identifies
organizational responsibilities associated with the Level II joint
activities.
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There is a significant level of importance to have early definition
of these "programmatics" in order to insure that the technical
community is aware of the unique requirements driven by a
partnership relationship. NASA is accustomed to forging ahead and
making decisions based on pure technical assessments.
The more
players, the more potential for unexpected impacts which we are
committed to consider.
The Program Definition and Requirements Document (PDRD) contains
requirements for space station flight element and ground systems
hardware and software, and provides the technical basis for the
overall conduct of Phase C/D. In order to assure a "partnership"
relationship as opposed to one where NASA hands requirements to the
international participants, a "Joint" PDRD (JPDRD) is maintained
with each Partner. Each JPDRD addresses the applicability of EVERY
requirement in the PDRD. All requirement changes that are brought
to the Control Board (SSCB) must address the applicability to the
JPDRD paragraphs.
This ensures partner participation in all
proposed design changes.
Additional joint management mechanisms take the form of meetings
and reviews. The bilateral Joint Program Reviews (JPRs) are held
between NASA Level II and each Partner twice a year.
The JPRs
serve as the highest level forum for discussion and resolution of
matters that requires the direct attention of the respective
program managers. These face-to-face meetings have proven to be
very effective in maintaining the successful implementation of
program development. The full contingent of NASA and its Partners
have a multilateral Program Management Review on a quarterly basis.
On a technical level, Technical Interchange Meetings, multi-, or
bi-lateral, are called when a need arises, and have been utilized
very effectively and occur on a routine basis at the working-level
environments.
Lines of Authority
As much as joint management and team work play a critical role in
the development of the Space Station Freedom, clearly there must be
a position that possesses the ability to make a final decision on
issues where compromise was unobtainable. The importance of having
an "honest broker" is evident. The Level II Deputy Director of the
SSFP is the chairman of the SSCB and has the final vote concerning
the Station technical baseline.
But in his position, he is not
only "brokering" between NASA and the IPs, but the Work Packages as
well. This management system with an independent program office
was set up deliberately, to obtain decisions that are the best for
the program as a whole.
The IPs benefit from this structure.
Should a jointly-agreed-to solution not be achievable at Level II,
an appeal avenue is possible via Level I. This appeal route has
not been utilized to date.
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CONCLUSIONS

The Space Station Freedom Program, could represent the first of an
a potential wave of future space exploration international
This program can
initiatives - for the near and far future.
represent how serious the U.S. is concerning international
commitments.
This program does represent a transition for NASA as~ it
international partners on a more equitable basis than on previous
The technical success of these eindeawom
cooperative programs.
relies heavily on the establishment of the ground rules as early mm
The complexity of a progrm degrade
possible in the program.
attention to the critical importance of working within those rules
Close cooperation is
at all levels of the organizations.
simply a desire, but a requirement at all phases of the progran*
the
of
complexities
the
recognize
must
partner
Each
interrelationship between the political, programmatic and tedmicaJ.
aspects of all programs and stand by the commitments established*
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